

# Prosiding Jihad Propaganda of Islamic Populism Groups on Indonesia's Presidential Election 2019

*by* Siti Mahmudah

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**Submission date:** 13-Aug-2022 03:46AM (UTC+0700)

**Submission ID:** 1881870658

**File name:** Proceedings\_ICONIS.pdf (3.44M)

**Word count:** 9721

**Character count:** 53625

## INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ISLAM AND

## MUSLIM SOCIETIES (ICONIS) 2019

**Indonesian Civil Islam: Intertwin Among Moderatism,  
Conservatism, and Populism**

Laras Asri Resort & Spa

Salatiga, 6 -7 August 2019

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**Publisher**

Pascasarjana IAIN Salatiga

Jl. Lingkar Salatiga Km 2. 50716.

website: [iconis.iainsalatiga.ac.id](http://iconis.iainsalatiga.ac.id)

**PROCEEDINGS****INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ISLAM AND MUSLIM SOCIETIES  
(ICONIS) 2019****Theme:**

Indonesian Civil Islam: Intertwin Among Moderatism, Conservatism, and Populism

**Venue:**

Laras Asri Resort & Spa, Salatiga

**Date:**

6 - 7 August 2018

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ISBN.

**Publisher**

11

Pascasarjana IAIN Salatiga

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## WELCOMING SPEECH

Director of Magister Program State Institute For Islamic Studies (IAIN) Salatiga

Assalamu'alaikum Wr. Wb

The emergence of conservatism and populism, most specifically in Post-Suharto Indonesia, challenge the notion of “Indonesian Civil Islam” and the project of “re-hermeneuticization of Islam” in Indonesia. The emergence of social media contributes to the increased participation of the citizens in effecting public policy, on the one hand, but on the other hand, it has an impact to the strengthening of conservatism, most specifically among millennial generation. It is worth remarking that conservative Muslims are active in social media, and accordingly considered as “new religious authorities”. They are outspoken in claiming that they are representing the Muslim community (al-ummah al-islamiyyah). Such propaganda and claim are quite attractive for many Muslims across the country, and consequently lead to the fragmentation of the Muslim community and Indonesian nation.

The Indonesian Conference of Islam and Muslim Societies (ICONIS) will constitute a contribution in unravelling recent challenges and prospects of “Indonesian Civil Islam”. It is hoped that this conference not only contributes in purely theoretical domain, but also has significance in practical level, at least in providing policy recommendations for strengthening “Indonesian Civil Islam”.

The ICONIS is one of leading programmes of the Postgraduate School of State Institute for Islamic for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Salatiga. Our postgraduate School and our university are concerned with the transformation from a teaching university to a research university. A research university mainly deals with knowledge production, knowledge sharing, and knowledge shopping. During the ICONIS, the scholars are involved in these three interrelated ventures. The scholars are concerned with “moving of bodies and ideas”. They have to be active, both physically and intellectually, so that they may pay a significant contribution for the scholarly world. The undertakings of the scholars will have an implication, not only for the accreditation of their respective university, but also the reputation of their university.

Salatiga, July 2019

Best Regards,

Asfa Widiyanto

Director of Magister Program

## WELCOMING SPEECH

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Rector of State Institute For Islamic Studies (IAIN) Salatiga

*Assalaamu'alaikum.w.w*

His Excellency Minister of Religious Affairs, Mr. Lukman Hakim Saifuddin,

Honourable Key Note Speakers

Honorable Rectors of UIN and IAIN all over Indonesia

Honourable all dignitaries, the guests and selected participants that I cannot mentioned one by one

All beloved committee of ICONIS 2019

First of all let us thank be to Allah almighty, who has blessed us in the historical moment especially at IAIN Salatiga today so that we can attend and join the second International Conference on Islam and Muslim Society (ICONIS). *Shalawat* and *salam* regard to the prophet Muhammad peace be upon him, the last prophet and messenger.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Personally as well as Rector of IAIN Salatiga, I would like to say welcome to IAIN salatiga. I also would like to express my gratitude H.E Minister of Religious Affairs, all rectors, elected participants and the committee who get involved in organising of this program, International Conference of Islam and Muslim Society. This event is the second round which the first one was carried out in 2018.

I realise that this conference is positively appreciated by many researchers but the committee should consider finding the relevant articles to be presented here. After that, the committee in cooperation with International Journal on Islam and Muslim Society (IJIMS) will select some articles to be published at IJIMS, which has been indexed by SCOPUS as well as awarded Quartile One (Q 1) in Islamic Studies and Humanities Journal. This achievement may not be gained without any taking apart of researchers and readers who actively cited and circulated of the journal among colleagues. Therefore I really appreciate and salute for researchers and participants who keep joining of this conference as one of a means of knowledge sharing.

I hope that this conference will be useful for academicians to share their research and publish it at the most prestigious journal such as IJIMS. It is an honour and privilege for me to here with all of you. Finally let us begin this conference by reciting *Basmallah* together. I wish we will have a fruitful discussion and conference in the near future with you all, thank you.

*Wassalaamu'alaikum.w.w.*

Rector

Prof. Dr. Zakiyuddin

## COMMITTEE REPORT

The honorable  
Rector of IAIN Salatiga  
The honorable keynote speakers  
Dr. Khairudin Aljunied  
Dr. Kamaludeen Bin Mohamed Nasir  
Dr. Mohd Roslan Bin Mohd Nor  
Hammam, Ph.D  
Dean, the leaders of IAIN Salatiga  
Participants and Presenters  
The distinguished Guests

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Assalamu `alaikum wr. wb.

Praise be to Allah SWT for His blessings and grace that this conference can be held this year. Shalawat and salam always be handed over to our Prophet Muhammad SAW.

The International Conference on Islam and Muslim Societies (ICONIS) 2019 was organized as the effort of the IAIN Salatiga Graduate Program to realize the vision as one of the "Referral Center of Islamic Studies" in Central Java and Indonesia. We continue to work hard on the road map to achieve the milestones of that vision. This conference is also an annual program that will be continuously implemented as a meeting place for scholars from various fields of social sciences and humanities who have concern for Islamic studies. We benefit from this conference as a vehicle to build collaborative networks between universities, as well as capturing quality articles for the publication of *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies (IJIMS)*. Thanks to Allah SWT, this journal has been indexed by Scopus since August 13, 2017, and become the first journal in Indonesia who has been indexed by Scimago Journal Ranking (SJR) with the best Quartile 1 or Q1 on 31 May 2019.

The honorable audience, In this conference, there are 57 presenters coming from various institutions in Indonesia and collaborators from the National University Of Singapore (NUS) Singapore, Department of History, National Cheng Kung University (NCKU) Taiwan, University of Malaya, Malaysia, and Nanyang Technological University Singapore. On behalf of all the rector IAIN Salatiga and committee of ICONIS, I would like to extend our warmest welcome to all keynote speakers and presenters from UIN Suska Riau, Institut Agama Islam Negeri Bengkulu, IAIN Kudus, UIN Walisongo Semarang, Police Science College, State Institute For Islamic Studies Of Jember, Sebelas Maret University Surakarta, Diponegoro University, State Islamic University Of North Sumatra, University 17 August 1945 Cirebon, IAIN Pontianak, UNJ, UIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, Reseach Center For Society And Culture, Indonesian Institute Of Sciences (PMB-LIPI), UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Department Of Malay Studies, STAI Nur El Ghazy Bekasi, University Of Muhammadiyah Mataram, State Islamic University Of Sulthan Thaha Saifuddin Jambi, Universitas Islam Nahdlatul Ulama Jepang, State University Of Malang, University Of Mataram Indonesia, UIN Raden Fatah Palembang, Wiraraja University, Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Gunung Djati, Bandung, Fakultas Ekonomi Dan Bisnis UIN Antasari Banjarmasin, Faculty Of Islamic Studies, Universitas Islam Sultan Agung, State Islamic Institute Of Madura, State Islamic University (UIN) Raden Intan, Lampung, Indonesia, Faculty Of Social Science And Political Science, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Institut Agama Islam Negeri Palopo, University Of Halu Oleo, *Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Kerinci*, Universitas Airlangga, University Of Ahmad Dahlan, Andalas University Padang, Institut Pesantren KH. Abdul Chalim, Universitas Pancasakti Tegal, IAI Hamzanwadi NW Pancor, IAIN Pontianak

Finally for all presenters, keynote speakers and participants, we would like to say "welcome and enjoy the conference".

Wassalamu `alaikum wr. wb.

Chair of Committee

Noor Malihah, Ph.D



# Jihad Propaganda of Islamic Populism Groups on Indonesia's Presidential Election 2019

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## Abstract

This study examines the motives for using jihad as propaganda tool by Islamic populism groups on Indonesia's Presidential Election 2019. The concept of jihad has been used by this groups to achieve victory or reject defeat. They used the name of jihad to refuse the election results, like in the Constitutional Court and in actions was called "people power" that ended in riots. The question to be examined in this article: what is the propaganda motives for jihad and why did they fail in 2019. This article aims to find the motive for using "jihad" and the causes of failure. This research uses qualitative methods, power relations theory and historical approaches to facilitate the author in collecting and processing data. While the data analysis is done using the theory and approach gradually and layered using the creative imagination of the writer. The results of this study found the propaganda motive of jihad was to win the struggle for Muslim votes in the contestation of presidential elections 2019 and to legitimize their claims as true "Islamic fighters", while the failure of propaganda was mostly due to the ability of Indonesian nationalism and moderate Muslims to build solidity and succeed explain to the public the occurrence of irregularities in jihad teachings carried out by Islamic populism groups.

**Key words:** *Propaganda Jihad; Islam Populism; Indonesia's Presidential Election 2019*

## Introduction

The Islamic populism groups have used jihad as propaganda tool, which was called by President Joko Widodo—popularly known as Jokowi—with the term Russian-style political propaganda on Indonesia's Presidential Election 2019. They always issued blasphemies of slander (firehose of falsehood), hoaxes, lies, deceiving society, destroying democracy, and dividing the NKRI. The aim is to defeat the truth that exists.

<sup>1</sup> They also have used religious issues from the Al-Qur'an and Hadiths that are formulated in the form of hoaxes and slanderous news to be disseminated to the public through online media. Supporters of the number 02 presidential and vice presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno have described that fighting Jokowi is jihad, because Jokowi and his group are enemies of Islam, descendants of communist, and Christian, although Jokowi is devout Muslim.<sup>2</sup> All allegations of slander were addressed to Jokowi with the aim that the public not vote for him on Indonesia's presidential election 2019; became one of the strategies to win Prabowo-Sandi; and make public sympathy for power.

Many researchers before, like Muzayyin Ahyar and Alfitri (2019) explained that there is a new online vehicle. This action continues to be voiced through the internet and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and so forth with the jargon "212 spirit". If with "spirit 212" they successfully won the Jakarta's Governorial Election 2017 so with this same enthusiasm they want to repeat the victory to win a higher seat, the president's position as head of state. The voluminous actions of "Aksi Bela Islam (Defending Islam action) 212" sound like an authoritative propaganda jargon which are exhale to spread the Islamic identity through the internet. this article argues that Islamic social movement in the millennial age—especially in the post 212 movement—has consistency to play a role in political contestation through the Islamic clicktivism.<sup>3</sup>

Azumardi Azra (2017) has argued that Anies-Sandi's victory in the Jakarta's Governorial Election 2017 era was the victory of The Islamic populism groups,<sup>4</sup> that were rising through "Aksi Bela Islam 212" movement.<sup>5</sup> The movements began with action October 14, 2016 (1410), October 28, 2016 (2810), November 4, 2016 (411), December 2, 2016 (212), February 11, 2017 (112), February 21, (212 volumes 2),

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<sup>1</sup>Kompas TV, "Polemik Propaganda Ala Rusia di Pilpres 2019," Monday, 04 Februari 2019, accessed Juli 14, 2019, <https://www.kompas.com> article.

<sup>2</sup>Berita Internasional, "Pilpres 2019: Didukung Islam Garis Keras, Mengapa Prabowo Masih Bisa Kalah?," April 8, 2019, accessed Juli 12 2019, <https://www.matamatapolitik.com/>.

<sup>3</sup>Alfitri, M. A., "Aksi Bela Islam: islamic clicktivism and the new authority of religious propaganda in the millennial age inIndonesia," *IJIMS: Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, Volume 9, Number 1, (June 2019), 2-3.

<sup>4</sup>Azumardi Azra, "Populisme Islam (1)," Thursday, Desember 28, 2017 09.24 WIB, accessed 14 Juli, 2019, <https://republika.co.id/berita/kolom/resonansi/p1ng1k440/populisme-islam-1>.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

March 31, 2017 (313) , and action May 5, 2017 (55 Action).<sup>6</sup> These actions have been triggered by the statement of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama—popularly known as Ahok—during his visiting to the Thousand Islands on September 27, 2016. Ahok gave a speech in front of the residents by quoting letter al-Maidah verse 51 which essentially stated that the voters were not "deceived" by using the verse to not choose leaders from Christian circles, including Ahok himself.

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar (2010)<sup>7</sup> identified the term radical with the Islamic populism groups by borrowing the term Vedi R Hadiz. This article argues that the emergence of radical groups that form as terrorists in Indonesia was not from theology, but came from economic politics. The solution offered is to alleviate the poverty of the Indonesian people. Endi Aulia Guardian (2018)<sup>8</sup> analyzed the origins of the Islamic populism groups, which comes from people who have an interest in power or economic benefits have proved to make political power in the society, rather than religious ideology or teachings itself. The Islamic populism groups often arises and positions itself as the oppressed. The rise of the new Islamic populism model in the Muslim world is actually just another version of populism occurring in the West, as happened in the case of Donald Trump (United States) and Brexit (United Kingdom). The new Islamic populism model is only a form of expression in responding to the development of an economic system that often changes and tends to be detrimental, or even excludes some groups. This study is presented in order to clarify the phenomenon that has occurred in the event of Ahok's defeat in the Jakarta's Governorial Election 2017.

The researchers before have analyzed that the rise of Islam began to develop since the 1980s and thrived since 1998 until now has given rise to the new Islamic populism model. This group believes that only their religion (Islam) is the most righteous, and only Muslims are entitled to become leaders in Indonesia. For this reason, they have legalized "Aksi Bela Islam 212" movement to oppose and reject the regime; and even try to thwart the opponents of political figures who have succeeded, either on the Jakarta's Governorial Election 2017 or the Presidential Election April 2019. The gap is that in research to find the motive for using "jihad" as a propaganda tool for the sake of political power and a factor in its failure on the Presidential Election April 2019.

The solution offered is to re-explain the meaning of jihad in sharia and realign it the motive for using jihad as propaganda tool that has been misinterpreted. Where jihad has been interpreted as fighting

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Umar, A. R., "Melacak Akar Radikalisme Islam di Indonesia," *Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*, Volume 14, Number 2 (Nopember 2010), 169.

<sup>8</sup> Garadian, E. A, "Membaca Populisme Islam Model Baru," *Indnesian Journal for Islamic Studies* , Volume 25, Number 3 (2018), 396.

for the sake of the people for the Rida Allah, but <sup>3</sup> for the sake of political power in order to win the political figure, and vice versa, namely defeating political opponents.

### The Appearance of the Islamic Populism Groups in Indonesia

The domination and hegemony of Western countries over the Muslim world was the initial phase of the appearance of the Islamic populism groups on the colonialism era. Inequality between social classes becomes specific product born from the womb of the political system that was hegemonic at that time. Such as global Muslim community, the struggle against Western colonial domination (ummah), even though used the concept of Khilafah, is one thing very difficult to realize. Even so, the struggle for justice, social equality, and freedom from the shackles of colonialism continued.<sup>9</sup>

The line of the struggle of the Islamic populism groups incorporated in certain organizations was concern against colonialism which was considered to marginalize Muslims in the early. However, in subsequent developments, the role of these organizations tends to be insignificant. The vocal political figures at the national level are more successful in attracting in the societies. Even in the post-colonial era, the political field was increasingly dominated by secular groups which had an impact on the marginalization of Islamic groups. In contrast to other Muslim regions, Indonesia's Islamic populism positioned the Chinese ethnic more like a "common enemy". On the 1970s era, the Islamic populism groups began to shift to Islamic political activism which intended to replace the state system which was being controlled by an authoritarian regime. This is the initial foundations that form the new Islamic populism model. The cross-class alliance began to form slowly under the banner of Islam, and Islam became an entity of unity in opposing groups considered as enemies, both ideologically and politically.<sup>10</sup> The rise of the new Islamic populism model in the Muslim world is actually just another version of populism occurring in the West, as happened in the case of Donald Trump (United States) and Brexit (United Kingdom). The new Islamic populism model is just a form of expression in responding to the development of an economic system that often changes and tends to be detrimental or even excludes some groups.

Regarding the appearance of the new Islamic populism model in Indonesia, according to Endi Aulia Guardian (2018), it has actually been practiced through a grassroots missionary movement by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) under the banner of the National Fatwa Guards - Indonesian Ulema Council (GNPF-MUI) ) which later became the National Ulema Fatwa Guards Movement (GNPFU). The

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<sup>22</sup>  
<sup>9</sup>Vedi R. Hadiz, "Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East," Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, sebagaimana direview oleh Endi Aulia Garadian, dimuat dalam [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320169192\\_Membaca\\_Populisme\\_Islam\\_Model\\_Baru](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320169192_Membaca_Populisme_Islam_Model_Baru), accessed Juli 16, 2019.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

missionary movement by confronting the ugliness of the system of the secular state succeeded in gathering many masses. While social media also helped facilitate GNPFU in smoothing out their agendas. In fact, even though Ahok had been imprisoned, they still used the same fuel as the barrage of "Aksi Bela Islam 212" movement did. For example, to thwart Jokowi on the Presidential Election 2019, political Islamic groups under GNPFU poured issues through WhatsApp, messenger about the position of the Jokowi regime which was not pro-Muslim, the issuance of the Public Order Perppu, and the regime's tendency to defend Ahok the harassing of religion.<sup>11</sup> This study is presented in order to clarify the phenomenon that has occurred in the event of the defeat of Ahok on the Jakarta's Governorial Election 2017.

### The Terms of Jihad

The meaning of jihad is often misunderstood by some Muslims today. They use jihad for political purposes only so that it does not meet with the original goal of jihad. This phenomenon can be seen from a series of the terror action in the name of religion (Islam). Jihad which must be fought today is the ability to fight against self-ego, not to take up arms and fight against human beings who are deemed disagree with them. According to Nasaruddin Umar, jihad is not to kill people, but to revive people, to revive dry souls, to revive the economy of weak people, to revive the poor to be excited about life. Jihad is also to revive a sense of optimism in society.<sup>12</sup>

Al-Jihad in general terms it is part of war,<sup>13</sup> Whereas the word jihād happens altogether 41 times in the Al-Qur'an with the subsequent meanings: (1) attempt a result of the logical virtue, (2) war non-Muslim riders exerting pressure to create abandoned Islamic youngsters, (3) solemn oaths and (4) physical strength.<sup>14</sup> Whereas the word al-jihad accompanied by the clause fi sabil Allah is listed in the Al-Qur'an as much as fifty times. The word al-jihad comes from the word juhd or jahd. Juhd means exerting energy, effort or strength, and Jahd means seriousness in work. According to Imam Raqib al-Isfahani (w.502H / 1108 M), the word jihad in the Al-Qur'an has three meanings, namely: (1) fighting against the real enemies; (2) fighting against *setan*; and (3) struggling with lust. Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziah mentions that jihad consists of four dignity, namely: (1) jihad against lust; (2) jihad against *setan*; (3) jihad against unbelievers (*kafir*);<sup>15</sup> and (4) jihad against hypocrites (*munaḥik*).<sup>16</sup> So in the opinion of both, jihad is defined as "using or issuing

<sup>11</sup>Garadian, E. A, "Membaca Populisme Islam Model Baru," Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies Volume 25, Number 3, (2018), 388.

<sup>12</sup>Bbc news Indonesia, "Jihad, Khilafah, dan Konsep Lain yang Banyak Digunakan Menanamkan Bibit Intoleransi," Mei 17, 2018, accessed Juli 8, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/Indonesia/>

<sup>13</sup>Iwansyah, H., "Islam and the Provisions of War", Jurnal *al-Adalah* Volume 15, Number 2 (2018), 327.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, 328

<sup>15</sup>Unbelievers or polytheists who started a war against the Muslims, see Q.S. Al-Baqarah (2): 190-193.

<sup>16</sup>Abdul Aziz Dahlan, *Ensiklopedi Hukum Islam, Jilid 4*, Jakarta: PT Ichtiar Baru Van Hoeve, 2001, 1395.

energy, power, effort, or strength to fight a disgraceful object in order to uphold the religion of Allah. The intended object is (1) visible enemy; (2) *Setan*; and (3) lust. Whereas jihad in a special sense is usually referred to *jihad fi sabil Allah* (fighting in the way of Allah).<sup>17</sup>

Jihad means fighting against the enemy (*'aduw*), the meaning of jihad above, according to Syarif, is a non-physical enemy, namely *setan*. In the reality that the bombing action, assault, destruction—by some Muslims—was claimed as an action or a jihad movement with a symbol “Allahu Akbar”.<sup>18</sup> This is always done by “*Aksi Bela Islam 212*” movement with the motto of jihad in the way of Allah to defend the people, both during on the Jakarta’s Governorial Election 2017 or on the Presidential Election 2019.

In fiqh terminology, according to the Hanafi School of Ulama, jihad is preaching to the Islamic religion and war against people who do not accept the mission, both with the wealth or the soul. Imam Syafi’i interpreted jihad as a war against infidels for the victory of Islam. While Ahmad Muhammad al-Huffy interpreted jihad, which is fighting in the way of Allah swt. which is required by sharia in order to face people who are hostile to religion or to defend the homeland of the Muslims and enemies of Islam.<sup>19</sup>

The purpose of jihad that is permissible in the Islamic religion, namely: (1) Jihad in the way of Allah swt. intended to prevent the occurrence of slander, as explained in the Al-Qur'an surat al-Baqarah verse 190 "and fight them, so that there is no longer slander and (so) obedience is solely for Allah. If they stop (from opposing you), then there is no hostility (again), except for the wrongdoers".<sup>20</sup> On the basis of these verses, jihad is also to defend weak people (*al-mustad'afin*) who have converted to Islam who are tortured by wrongdoers as explained in the Al-Qur'an above.

### Jihad Propaganda in Indonesia

The propaganda is a series of messages that aim to influence the opinions and behavior of the community or group of people. The propaganda sometimes conveys the right message, but it is often misleading, where generally the content of propaganda only conveys the facts of choice which can produce certain influences, or produce more emotional reactions than rational reactions. The aim is to change the cognitive mind of the subject's narrative in the target group for specific purposes.

In the politics, the propaganda is a method as well as a very effective tool for gaining the advantage of a political position while at the same time dropping an opponent's political position which is carried out more than once or continuously. Even Jozef Goebbels, Nazi Minister of propaganda in Hitler's era, argued that repeated lies were very effective propaganda. According to him, spread lies repeatedly to the public

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Syarif, *Proporsionalisasi Makna Jihad: Satu Titik Ikhtiar Deradikalisasi*, Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2019, 217-218.

<sup>19</sup> Abdul Aziz Dahlan, *Ensiklopedi . . .*, 1396.

<sup>20</sup> Q.S. Al-Baqarah (2): 190

because repeated lies will make the public believe. He taught that the greatest lie is the truth that is changed only slightly.<sup>21</sup>

On the basis of the above study, the word propaganda is often perceived poorly. This is reasoned because propaganda is a political tool for those who want to win the fight with a variety of negative approaches. The main goal is to foster hatred of the enemy, to preserve the friendship of allies, and to destroy the spirit of the enemy.<sup>22</sup> Such as thing has also been practiced in Indonesia since the emergence of the political Islam movement (Islamist), which has begun to exist since before Indonesian independence, and began to rise after the fall of the new order regime on 1998 until now.

The political Islam movement (Islamist),<sup>23</sup> characterized by two models of movement; namely structural and cultural. The *first* movement model was marked by the rise of Islamic parties, such as the Moon Star Party (PBB), The Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Community Awakening Party (PKU), New Masjumi Party, and United Party (PP). The *second* movement model was marked by the emergence of Islamic mass organizations, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Laskar Jihad (LJ), Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and following other movements that have existed since The New Order, such as the Indonesian Muslim Workers's Association (PPMI), and the Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity (KISDI). Islamic movements use the concept of jihad as propaganda tool, shouting calling for a totalitarian world order by holding discourses and religious activities aimed at sowing norms, symbols, and rhetoric filled with suspicion, hatred and even violence. As proof, there have been bombings everywhere, such as in Bali on October 2002 and 2005, at the Marriot Hotel and Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 2004, Marriot and Ritz-Carlton Hotels in Jakarta on 2009, and near the Church of Christ Cathedral, Serpong, on 2010-2012.<sup>24</sup>

The Appearance of Islamic parties and Islamic mass organizations that have led to a model of Islamic populism that is identical with jihad propaganda. But it is also often used by political figures in order to support a seat of power. The proof is related to President Jokowi's victory on the Presidential Election 2014. Where the losing candidate continues to invite Islamist groups to exist in the public space by

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<sup>21</sup>The Religious Movements Page: Conceptualizing "Cult" and "Sect". Archived from the original on February 7, 2006, accessed 15 14, 2019.

<sup>22</sup>Severin Werner J, James W. Tankard. Jr. 2001. "Teori Komunikasi: Sejarah, Metode, dan Terapan dalam Media Massa. Jakarta," 2001, accessed Juli 14, 2019, <https://www.penalutim.co.id/2019/02/09/pengertian-propaganda-politik-dan-tujuannya/>

<sup>23</sup>Islamist is mass movement, for social change due to dissatisfaction and disappointment with regime that is considered authoritarian and does not care about people's poverty. <sup>3</sup> characteristics, this movement was followed by period that was quite large and difficult to fight. Mahmudah, S., "Islamisme: Kemunculan dan Perkembangannya di Indonesia," *Jurnal Aqlam: Journal of Islam and Plurality*, Volume 3, Number 1 (2018), 5.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 5-6.

inciting the ordinary people with bursts of slander and hoaxes by accusing Jokowi of being a descendant of PKI, which in fact is no longer feasible to appear in the current Indonesian context. This is different era, that the issue of PKI is only a political issue to bring down opponents and search for the weaknesses of opponents.<sup>25</sup>

The practice of using jihad as propaganda tool by Islamic populism groups was truly evident on Jakarta's Governorial Election 2017. Anies-Sandi's victory based on the results of the Quick Count and Real Count went smoothly—this was inversely proportional to what happened on the Presidential Election 2019 ago— because Ahok felt loyal and immediately congratulated the elected governor Anies-Sandi. This phenomenon of victory was the basis for Islamic populism groups in Indonesia and has created euphoria about the unity and revival of Indonesian Islam (religiously, politically, and economically). They were feeling most existent among adherents of other religions in Indonesia. They were having high confidence in facing on the Presidential Election 2019. Especially after they managed to imprison Ahok for 2 years, their strength seemed to more increase.

The concept of jihad propaganda used by Islamic populism groups before and after the Presidential Election 2019 was a continuation of the form of euphoria on Jakarta's Governor Election 2017. The concept of jihad was used by this group in order to reject the rival opponent Anies-Sandi, namely Basuki Tjahaja Purnama—popularly known as Ahok—who was considered an infidel and was not suitable to become Muslim leader. Their motto was that “We are Muslims, and we must support Muslim leaders”. So the use of the concept of jihad was very much related to the existence of power relations in order to achieve the victory of power politics.

Islamic populism groups, like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), were already convinced and confident that the jihad propaganda strategy was a weapon, both for Anies-Sandi who has already won and Prabowo-Sandi also wins on the Presidential Election 2019. This group has made a decision as anti-Ahok group on Jakarta's Governorial Election 2017 and then also anti-Jokowi on the Presidential Election 2019.

The Islamic populism has carried out attacks, claiming that Ahok committed blasphemy of religion (Islam), and who choose Christian, they will go to hell. The reason is that they were Jihad in the framework of defending Islam which Ahok had abused with a statement "lied to using verse al-Maidah verse 51". This jihad has given rise to the name they patented with “Aksi Bela Islam 212 movement”.<sup>26</sup>

Jihad was used as propaganda tool in the form of demonstration titled “Aksi Bela Islam 212 movement”, which was also done in volumes. *Aksi Bela Islam* volume I, which was fronted by hundreds of

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>26</sup>Alfitri, M. A., “Aksi Bela . . .”, 3.



members of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) or the puritanical Salafist groups under the leadership of Rizieq Shihab, was held in front of Jakarta City Hall on October 14, 2016. They demanded the arrest of Ahok. Furthermore, *Aksi Bela Islam volume II* has been held on November 4, 2016 (Action 411), December 2, 2016 (212), 11 February 2017, 21, February 2017, March 31, 2017, May 5, 2017.<sup>27</sup> The reason, according to Rizieq Shihab This Action was carried out solely in search of *Rida Allah*.

The word *Rida Allah* was used in order to get the sympathy of the people by The Islamic populism groups which continues to be crawled to all corners of Indonesia. In the end, this group succeeded in establishing Prabowo-Sandi as presidential candidate who would be defended to the last drop of blood for the sake of Islam and for getting *Rida Allah*. It turns out that some Indonesian Muslim communities believe and tempted even by fanatics to support the president they have chosen according to their scholars. Many Muslims have become militants both from the mothers and fathers, from young and old to children. Prabowo courted the 212 movement assiduously.<sup>28</sup> They want a more overtly and devoutly Islamic society and believe that the state of intervention should be in religious and social affairs to bring this about.

The results of jihad propaganda for getting of *Rida Allah* greatly ignited the spirit of hardline Islamists, so Habib Rizieq Shihab, founder of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) wanted the Prabowo camp to reuse that strategy to overthrow Jokowi. But Jokowi was vigilant and realized that he might lose his efforts for the second term, and decided to protect himself by working with the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

“According to Greg Fealy, NU has two main reasons for backing Jokowi: the first is patronage. NU, despite its vast size, is a relatively asset and program-poor organisation. It has historically placed great store on using politics to increase the flow of funds and lucrative positions to the organisation and its leaders. Jokowi has been willing to dispense favours to NU. Crucially, the organisation’s president, Ma’ruf Amin, was picked, albeit reluctantly, by the president to be his running mate.

Jokowi’s decision to choose Ma’ruf Amin as his vice-presidential candidate was widely seen as an attempt to appease Islamists as the NU president, who was also chairman of the National Ulema Council (MUI), had played an enabling role in the 212 Movement by issuing a MUI fatwa that Ahok was a blasphemer. But the over-riding reason Ma’ruf Amin was selected was because NU threatened to withdraw its support from Jokowi’s candidature if one of its own leaders was not picked.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>28</sup>Greg Fealy, “Indonesia’s Growing Islamic Divide,” Mei 4, 2019 19.48, accessed Juli 8, 2019, [https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=962311207308233&id=100005880883564](https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=962311207308233&id=100005880883564).

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*

The second and perhaps more important factor in NU siding with Jokowi is ideological. NU regards itself as the central pillar of moderate, pluralistic Islam in Indonesia, something that it regards as integral to the nation's identity."<sup>30</sup>

### Motives for Using Jihad by Islamic Populism Groups

Jihad was used as propaganda tool by the Islamic populism groups in order to win the struggle for Muslim votes in the contestation of the Presidential Election 2019, and to legitimize their claims as true "Islamic fighters". But it has been alleged that there was the Russian propaganda polemic. As an indication, there was success team that uses Russian-style political propaganda. They produce bursts of slander and hoaxes (firehose of falsehood), like used by the United States Rand Corporation political consultancy in 2016<sup>31</sup> and known as the propaganda Russia technique that has carried out on 2012-2017 in the Crimea crisis, the Ukrainian conflict, and civil war in Syria.<sup>32</sup> As well on the United States's Presidential Election 2016 against Hilary Clinton, operation technique of slander burst that was produced massively and simultaneously through the media coverage they had.

Russian-style jihad propaganda was produced, created and distributed in high numbers and frequencies, via various social media channels, quickly, continuously and repeatedly. The goal, *the first*, is to make lies, undermine democracy, divide NKRI against the truth.<sup>33</sup> *The second*, brainwashing of the community to receive an awareness that is not objective, starts with creating information or news. After that the supporting facts were created so that the news began to be believed to be true.<sup>34</sup> *The third*, is to benefit from political position, while at the same time dropping the political position of his opponent. *The fourth*, is to win the struggle for Muslim votes in the contestation of the Presidential Elections 2019 and to legitimize their claims as true "Islamic fighters".

The spirit of jihad as true warrior defended the people, for the sake of the people, as always said by supporters of candidate pair number 02 Prabowo -Sandi. If there were no other interests except just to defend the people. This is the populist style that was practiced by Prabowo and his supporters on the pre and post-Presidential Elections 2019. Jihad has been used as propaganda tool for The Islamic populism groups in the fight for victory and resistance to violence and accuses KPU of cheating. Behind the spirit of

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<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup>Liza Egeham, "Pemilihan Presiden, Semburan Propaganda Rusia dalam Pilpres 2019," February 3, 2019, accessed Juli 17, 2019, <https://www.liputan6.com/news/Raju>

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup>Kompas TV, "Polemik Propaganda Ala Rusia di Pilpres 2019," Monday, February 4, 2019, accessed Juli 5, 2019, <https://www.kompas.tv/article/40196/saat-propaganda-rusia-warnai-pilpres-indonesia>

<sup>34</sup>Syahganda Nainddolan, "Pilpres, Propaganda Rusia dan RAND Corporation," Wednesday, Juli 3, 2019, accessed Juli 9, 2019, <https://m.republika.co.id/>

jihad, there is actually meaning behind the meaning, namely that between the Islamic populism groups and Prabowo-Sandi were mutually wanting to be in power. The reason is that the Islamic populism groups really want Indonesia to be won and controlled by Muslims in order to practice their programs that have been delayed, namely making Indonesia sharia. Whereas Prabowo-Sandi definitely wants to be won on the Presidential Election 2019 defeating their rival Jokowi-Ma'ruf, just for the seat of power, namely the Indonesia's president position.

### **Jihad Propaganda Before the Presidential Election 2019**

The Islamic populism groups have used "jihad" as political propaganda tool on the Presidential Election 2019. The Jihad even though it is not interpreted by this group as war to kill people on the battlefield still interpreted the struggle in hard way, against and overthrowing tyranny, and the Kufr system. The most commonly used propaganda technique was name calling, which is labeling badly to opposing parties or opposite, and on the contrary, they used *bandwagon* techniques by the way of blaming certain groups, who are friends.

Jihad propaganda forms used by Islamic populism groups to carry out the mission of winning the candidate pair number 02 Prabowo-Sandi, before the Presidential Election 2019, among others: the *first*, Viral #2019GantiPresident (#2019ChangePresident), this hashtag was the target of jihad propaganda movements to attract millennial and womens. The presidential change hashtag action was created by the politician of The Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Mardani Ali Sera, as the antithesis from the campaign of Jokowi's supporting on social media. This action has been welcomed with great enthusiasm by Neno Warisman for inviting the President's Change Volunteers (RGP) to wealth jihad and prayer safaris towards April 17, 2019. According to Amien Rais, if millions of Muslims pray together, the sky door opens, and prayer will come true.<sup>35</sup> This is the sample of jihad propaganda used by supporters of Prabowo-Sandi's victory before the presidential election 2019.

*The Second*, #2019PrabowoJadiPresident (#2019PrabowoBecomePresident). Habib Rizieq Syihab used jihad propaganda remotely. The sample, he has sent a voicemail from Mecca which was played at 212 world awarding night, on December 2, 2018. He instructed the stronghold of Prabowo -Sandi to continue to increase the #2019GantiPresiden, and change it to #2019PrabowoJadiPresident at the beginning 2019. The aim was to make Prabowo-Sandi's winning mission more focused.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Nur Zah Rizki Astuti, "Neno Warisman Ajak Relawan Ganti Presiden Jihad Harta," Desember 2018, accessed Juli 8, 2019, <https://m.detik.com/news/berita/>

<sup>36</sup>You Tube CNN Indonesia, Januari 8, 2019 accessed Juli 12, 2019.

The Third, the Grand Reunion 212 held at the National Monument (Monas-Jakarta), permitted by Anies Rasyid Baswedan as governor of Jakarta<sup>37</sup>—on Sunday, December 2, 2018—was another form of jihad propaganda other than the one mentioned above. This jihad propaganda movement was accompanied by *dzikir*, *istighasah kubro*, and *tausiyah* from various leaders and scholars. This movement was a form of jihad propaganda practiced by Islamic populism groups to give confidence to the general public that the candidate pair number 02 Prabowo-Sandi received support from the ulema and could bring Indonesian change to a better direction. But this was only according to Islamist groups supporting Prabowo-Sandi.

The Fourth, the Great Campaign at Gelora Bung Karno (GBK) in the run-up to the Presidential Election 2019 which began early in the morning at 03.00 am, began with the *tahajut* prayer and morning prayers in congregation. In addition, also recited dhikr and prayers together, *salawat badar*, and *salawat* of the Prophet echoed on GBK before the grand campaign took place at 07.30 am. The figures present and delivered prayer for the candidate pair Prabowo-Sandi, among others, namely: Habib Syekh Bin Abdul Qadir Assegaf, Habib Hanif, Ustadz Bakhtiar Nasir. While the supporters present can be estimated at more than 1 million people.<sup>38</sup> The practice of *safari* prayers initiated by Neno Warisman was truly demonstrated in this event, and all of them who use this joint jihad, the doors of the heavens will be opened, their prayers granted, and "Win Gerindra, Prabowo President".

#### Jihad Propaganda Rejects Post-Election Defeat

The form of jihad propaganda used by Islamic populism groups after the Presidential Election 2019 was 21-22 May 2019 action. It was called people power or the National Sovereignty Movement (KNGR) carried out by Prabowo-Sandi supporters. The aim was to encourage investigation in the case of allegations of 2019 electoral fraud. This movement by Amien Rais and his group was referred to as jihad in the way of Allah or constitutional jihad. Whoever joins the demonstration on May 21-22, he has carried out jihad. Even to strengthen the propaganda narrative was made that the Prophet had fought in Ramadan. This is an example of twisting the meaning of jihad in the interests of power politics.

Another form of jihad that occurred in the context of rejecting the announcement of the vote acquisition results of the national election April 17, 2019 by the Election Commission (KPU) on 21 May 2019<sup>39</sup> was the jihad tour movement with the term "Jihad Surabaya-Jakarta". There were several types of

<sup>37</sup>Slamet Ma'arif, "Anies Beri Izin Gelar Reuni Akbar 212 di Monas 2 Desember 2018," Friday, November 6, 2018, accessed Juli 12, 2019, [poskotanews.com/](http://poskotanews.com/)

<sup>38</sup>Liputan6.com, "Kampanye Akbar Prabowo-Sandi, Jalan di Sekitar GBK Senayan Macet," April 7, 2019, accessed Juli 1, 2019, <https://www.liputan6.com/read/>

<sup>39</sup>The number of votes obtained by Jokowi-Ma'ruf was 85,606,362 or 55.50 percent of the votes, while Prabowo-Sandi's vote was 68,650 or 44.50 percent of the vote. The second difference in votes was 16,957,123 or 11 percent of

packages offered, namely: (1) the large bus containing 50 people for Rp. 450,000, -; (2) mini bus packages containing 30 people RP. 400,000, -; (3) elf cars for 12 people RP. 600,000 and (4) Toyota Avanza, Daihatsu Xenia, or Suzuki Ertiga cars for 6 people RP. 600,000. The tour departs from Surabaya to Jakarta on May 19 at 06.00 WIB. Then returned from Jakarta to Surabaya on May 23 at dawn. The last payment was May 17, 2019.<sup>40</sup>

As well, there are chain messages that spread on social media, calling peaceful actions or people power as jihad, and calling on people to participate. One of the demonstrators who invited the demonstration as jihad was the chairman of Fatwa National Movement (GNPF) the Bogor Ulema, Iyus Khaerunnas. According to him, the jihad in addition to fighting the fraud of the Election Commission (KPU) and the presidential election was also jihad against the tyranny of the government that protects communists. When Iyus was arrested, his attorney said that the Chairman of GNPF-U Bogor Iyus Khaerunnas did not call for jihad war in the 22 May Action, but rather for constitutional jihad to obtain justice and protest the alleged election fraud. However, whatever was said, the invitation sparked chaos during the demonstration in front of the Bawaslu and its surroundings so that it burned many cars in Jakarta.<sup>41</sup> The protest against the results of the Presidential Election 2019 was initially peaceful, in line with the rally's appeal on behalf of peaceful "people power", but in the evening, it ended in rioting after several groups of demonstrations which took place anarchists emerged.

### The Failure of Jihad Propaganda

Identity politics, such as the jihad propaganda used by Islamic populism groups, failed to win number 02 president and vice-presidential candidates. These various propagandas contained, among other things: massive hoaxes, slander, spreading fear, pessimism, scolding each other, and spreading hatred. The jihad propaganda strategy which was successfully carried out on the 2017 Jakarta's Governor Election 2017, failed to continue on the Presidential Election 2019. The politics of identity failed in gaining public sympathy, because in the reality that only a small proportion of the community agreed with the ways of Show of Force religion in the political activities.

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votes. Kompas.com, "KPU: Pengumuman Hasil Perolehan Hasil Perolehan Suara Bukan Pengumuman Pemenang Pemilu," May 21, 2019 11:32 WIB, accessed Juli 10, 2019, <https://nasional.kompas.com/>

<sup>40</sup> CNN Indonesia, "Simpatisan 02 di Surabaya Kemas Aksi 22 Mei Jadi 'Tour Jihad,'" May 17, 2019, accessed Juli 8, 2019, <https://m.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/>

<sup>41</sup> **Mata-Mata Politik, "Berikut Syarat dan Makna Jihad: Aksi 22 Mei Tak Bisa Disebut Jihad,"** May 23, 2019, accessed Juli 10, 2019 <https://www.matamatapolitik.com/polling-in-depth-berikut-syarat-dan-makna-jihad-aksi-22-mei-tak-bisa-disebut-jihad/>

The understanding of the people who were able to distinguish between the true jihad of false jihad was the impact of enlightenment which was continuously carried out by ulema and other educated people in various media. These Islamic scholars said that the jihad propaganda movement carried out by Islamic populism groups in front of the Bawaslu and the Election Commission's (KPU), or the hoaks spread by Sarumpaet, as well as other actions, was the political movement wrapped in religion. The 212 movement or GNPFU in its various actions was expressly stated as the political movement to gain political power. With continuous explanations verbally, in writing, in various media, the public knows a lot about the mistakes of the Islamic populism groups movement which was considered "masked" by this religion. Therefore, many people have not sympathized with the way or propaganda of 212 groups or Islamic populism groups. Community groups who like ceremonial religion in the political activities were only 212 alumni and supporters, whose numbers were very limited, and generally this Muslim segment was dominated by The Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) cadres and supporters, also from Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) supporting supporters, and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), even if there were Nahdliyyins involved, very few in number.

The reality mentioned above can be used as reason for the failure of the use of jihad propaganda in the Presidential Election 2019. *The first* reason is that the public has increasingly intelligently filtered where the information was based on reality and lies. The second reason, there are several bursts of lies uncovered, for example the case of Ratna Sarumpaet who later admitted that she lied had been beaten by an unknown person.<sup>42</sup> Then there was the news of the hoax that Neno Warisman's car was burned by someone, but the police clarification ensured that Neno's car caught fire due to a short circuit in the car's electrical system. This is an example of jihad propaganda practiced by Ratna Sarumpaet and Neno Warisman to support the candidate pair 02 Prabowo -Sandiaga, but by lying to the public. This case is clearly detrimental to Prabowo-Sandi and certainly very beneficial for Jokowi. So it is not wrong if Jokowi gives praise that Ratna Sarumpaet is an honest person.<sup>43</sup>

*The third* reason, there was a counter-movement that has been carried out by volunteers for presidential and vice-presidential candidate No. 01 Jokowi-Ma'ruf, namely "Gerakan Kampung Jokowi (the Jokowi Village movement)" which was located in Lubang Buaya Village, East Jakarta on February 26, 2019. The movement was held by supporters Jokowi joined in Posraya Indonesia. The aim was to conduct a positive campaign without hoaks with local residents in order to address the rampant negative campaign

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<sup>42</sup>Fahreza Rizky, "Strategi Semburan Fitnah Pada Pilpres 2019 Dinilai Akan Gagal," Saturday, February 9, 2019, accessed Juli 14, 2019, <https://news.okezone.com/read/>

<sup>43</sup>Muhammad Genantan Saputra, "Jokowi Sebut Ratna Sarumpaet Jujur: TKN Nilai Sindiran Untuk Kubu Prabowo," Monday, February 4, 2019, accessed Juli 9, 2019, <https://m.merdeka.com/>

against Jokowi-Ma'ruf on the Presidential Election 2019.<sup>44</sup> Tri Gaman (47), a citizen of Gg. Haji Buang, RW 05 Lubang Buaya said that in “Gerakan Kampung Jokowi (the Jokowi Village movement)” event they also promoted a program that President Jokowi had worked on the first period. Examples such as land certificate distribution program, Healthy Indonesia Card (KIS), Smart Indonesia Card (KIP), and Hope Family Program (PKH).

The fourth reason, Jokowi has chosen Ma'ruf Amin who was the main cadre of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), this was an ideal representation of the East Javanese people, the majority of whom are nahdiyyin groups.<sup>45</sup> The Javanese term “tumbu nemu tutup (pan met pot lid)”. This was also the answer to the accusation of the candidate pair 02 support groups that Jokowi was PKI and anti-Islam.

### Conclusion

The results of this study found that the motive for using jihad as propaganda tool was closely related to the existence of power relations in Indonesia. The aim is to win the struggle for Muslim votes in the contestation of presidential elections and to legitimize their claims as true "Islamic fighters". But it has been alleged that there was Russian propaganda polemic. There were bursts of slander and hoaxes that continue to be produced, created and distributed in high numbers and frequencies, via various social media channels, quickly and continuously and repeatedly. The goal, the first, was to make a lie, destroy the democracy, and divide NKRI to beat over the truth. The second, the brainwashing of the community to receive an awareness that was not objective starts with creating information or news. After that, the supporting facts were created so that the news began to be believed to be true. The third, was to benefit from the political position while at the same time dropping the political position of his opponent.

However, the role of ulema and moderate scholars succeeded in counteracting the discourse on jihad propaganda, and succeeded in dismantling slander and hoaxes in the use of jihad, as well as direct action movements in society, have been the cause of failure of jihad propaganda on the Indonesia's Presidential Election 2019. While the victory Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin on the Presidential Election 2019 was a major role of the main cadre of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), this was an ideal representation of the people on the island of Java, especially Central Java and East Java, the majority of whom were nahdiyyin groups.

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<sup>44</sup>Dwi Bowo Raharjo dan Fakhri Fuadi Muflih, “Buat Gerakan Kampung Jokowi, Cara Relawan Tangkal Hoaks,” Thursday, February 28, 2019, accessed Juli 14, 2019, <https://amp.suaracom/nens.nasional/>

<sup>45</sup>Yenny Wahid. *Paslon 01 Ulama, Paslon 02 Ubaru*. (Minggu, 07 April 2019 13.46, accessed Juli 10, 2019, <https://m.cnnindonesia.com>).

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