

VICTORY AND FAILURE OF ISLAMIC POPULIST GROUPS IN DKI JAKARTA'S 2017 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS AND INDONESIA'S 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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Abstract

Islamic populism is a movement that rejects the existence of disproportionate power relations. This happens as a form of disappointment and distrust of the regime related to the poverty experienced by the people. The main idea of Islamic populism is achieving the victory of political power in the context of defending Islam and the welfare of Muslims. The question examined in this study is: what are the impacts, strategies, and acceptance of the victory and failure of Islamic populism groups after the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections and the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Election? This paper aims to describe the impact, strategy, and acceptance of the victory and failure of Islamic populism groups after the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections and the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections. We use qualitative methods, power relations theory and historical approaches to collect, process, and analyze the data. The momentary victory received by the Islamic populism group after the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections which was used as a weapon in the pre-2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections leading to disappointment following the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections. This is an after-victory defeat of the Islamic populism. The Islamic populism groups were disappointed in Prabowo's approaching Jokowi as his political choice with the reason that real politics means victory.

Keywords: *Islamic Populism, Victory, Failure, Election, Indonesia*

A. Introduction

The victory of the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections has led to an exaggerated euphoria for Islamic populism groups. But, they failed during the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections. This phenomenon brought high academic anxiety for researchers both in Indonesia and abroad. It can be seen that the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections that Anies-Sandi won were supported by the Islamic populism group. On the contrary, the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections were won by Jokowi-Ma'ruf, who were supported by a moderate Islamic

and nationalist group (Nahdlatul Ulama). This is a real contestation between Islamic populism and moderate Islamic groups in Indonesia to determine the future of Indonesia.

Islamic populism groups have used hoaxes, the issues of SARA (ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group relations), and jihad as propaganda both in the 2017 Jakarta's gubernatorial elections or even in the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections. They always spread firehose of falsehood, hoaxes, lies. They deceived people, damaged democracy, and broke the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia while aiming at gaining political power of victory (Kompas TV, 2019). They used SARA issues, the verses of Qur'an and Hadith in the form of hoaxes, and news about slander were spread to the people of Indonesia through online media. Supporters of presidential and vice-presidential candidates number 02 Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno described that fighting Joko Widodo was considered jihad because Jokowi and his group were enemies of Islam, Jokowi was deemed descendant of a communist and Christians even though Jokowi was a devout Muslim. Their efforts to discredit Jokowi's policies turned into anti-Chinese sentiment (*Berita Internasional*, 2019). All the defamations were addressed to Jokowi to: persuade people to abstain from voting in the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections; become one of the surefire strategies to win Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno in the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections; seek public sympathy for the political power.

Vedi R. Hadiz stated that Islamic populism is a common phenomenon in Indonesia today. The reason is that a group of people who unite to fight for people's rights has not yet been realized in their perception. According to Vedi R. Hadiz, the mobilization of a distinct ummah based political identity in contests over power and resources in the present democratic period (Hadiz, 2018). The current movement of Islamic populism is in the name of a political victory of power. Abu Bakar Eby Hara stated that populism has not developed to be a strong movement in Indonesia because it is fragmented and used by various groups, political parties and presidential candidates to compete with one another (Hara, 2017). This shows that various interests resulted in contradictions between one group and another. It is the interests of the political victory of power. Eby Hara also emphasized that not only populism could interrupt the process towards democratic maturity, but also end democracy as people were mobilized by making use of ethnic and religious sentiments (Hara, 2017). This phenomenon can cause a crowded condition in democratic life, as happened in Indonesia in the pre- and post- 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections.

Alireza Raisi stated that analysts generally believed that populism results either from economic hardship (usually as a result of market-oriented policies) or as a bargaining strategy

by authoritarian rulers to buy off some segments of the society (Raisi, 2019). Islamic populism flourishes in authoritarian regimes as a form of rejection of regime policy as a result of the regime's track record that has created a top-down democratic life. So, it impacts on national life in terms of politics, culture, social, and the economic downturn. This sparks people's emotions to the regime. Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej stated, "we need to develop differently, it is possible to link up populist leaders (parties) and followers in a systematic fashion" (Zaslove, 2019). This is intended to prevent the existence of patronism and clientelism in populism. Verbeek and Zaslove try to make a different point of view to prevent the emergence of populism in group by uniting the same ideological approach, without any selfish attitude among the individuals in the group. In addition, they stated that the dual quality of the notion of a thin centered ideology will prevent systemic biases towards any one of populism (Zaslove, 2019).

Populist movements are often unstoppable. The desire of every individual to realize the right life in his/her perception may not be the same as the perspective of others. It can cause vertical emotion into horizontal conflict in public space dubbed national populism by Pierre Andre Taguieff: the polarized opposition between 'us' and 'them' in both vertical and horizontal dimensions (Brubaker, 2017). However, the vertical polarization of national populism is explained by Rogers Brubaker as the opposition between "the people" and "the elite." This means that there is an implicit message in the national populism involving the people and the political elites. This contains a narration as was said by Vedi R. Hadiz regarding 'the ummah' populism. On the other hand, Rogers Brubaker said that in the horizontal dimension, the opposition is between insiders and outsiders about who shares our way of life and those on the outside who are said to threaten our way of life, such as globalization, unfettered trade, radical Islam and so on (Brubaker, 2017). So, the manifesto of the national populist movement is the form of protection and rejection by the people against the global modernization consisting of discrepancies in the life of the nation and state.

Previous researchers have analyzed that the background of Islamic populism groups is the imbalance in the practice of power relations. For this reason, they have legalized the Islamic Defending Action (ABI) continuously to antagonize the regime, reject the regime, and even try to thwart their opponents of political figures, both in the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections and the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections. This study aims to understand the emergence and movement of Islamic populism in Indonesia politics which has made Islam as a political tool to gain the votes to achieve political victory. In this case, We have another point of view in mapping the Islamic populism groups in Indonesia, where they participate in determining

and influencing the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections and the 2019 Presidential Elections. This is because the Islamic populism is the main variable as stakeholders influencing the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections and the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections, as well as bringing the flow of Islamic populism nationally in the formation of democratic politics in Indonesia.

The solution offered is to clarify the misunderstanding of Islamic populism groups regarding the use of hoaxes and issues misinterpreted and considered as the only ways of political victory for power. For example, the initial meaning of jihad should have been fighting for the people to seek Allah's pleasure, but the Islamic populism groups used it for the sake of political power to win their political figures and defeat their political opponents as well as to reject political victory on the reason of cheating.

B. Research Methods

This study is a qualitative study examining the strategy, impact, influence, and acceptance of political victory and failure of Islamic populism groups after the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections and the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections. This research is library research. This means that the data and materials used come from literary sources such as books related to the topic of study, encyclopedias, journals, magazines, newspapers and online media.

This research focuses on the strategy, impact, influence, and acceptance of the political victory and failure of Islamic populism groups after the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections and the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections. The data is critically analyzed step by step using the power-relations theory through contextual-history approaches so the qualitative analysis was carried out along with the initial data collection obtained through library data and was then elaborated with the writers' creative imagination.

C. Islamic Populism Groups in Indonesia

1. Definition of Islamic Populism

Islamic Populism is a trending topic among scientists, political observers, and researchers in Indonesia and abroad. The word "populism" combined with the word "Islam"

has its meaning. They are a group of Muslims caring about poor people by admitting and upholding their rights (Retnoningsih, 2011). The problem is that they use the term Islamic populism for a political victory of power which is strongly influenced by power relations and a political figure needing need their help.

Rangga Kusumo defines Islamic populism as a manifestation of protest against the imbalance in the practice of power relations. He explained that Islamic populism refers to some meanings related to popular issues such as hoaxes and SARA issues, especially to groups who are marginalized and disappointed by actions of the regime (Kusumo, 2018). This stands to reason that Islamic populism has become a massive movement in the name of religious equality i.e., Indonesian Muslims.

Then, Islamic populism can be simply defined as a Muslim group that is discriminated against and marginalized by power (*Nuonline*, Ahad 7 April 2019 22:07 WIB). This condition causes Islamic populism groups to have equality in fate and goals which then emerge a massive social movement. They successfully created a narrative language to reject the regime because they had been treated unfairly; Ulema and Muslims were oppressed; the government was truly thaghut, foreign defenders, PKI, and anti-Islam. These messages were able to encourage them to move together in criticizing the elected regime as cheating and illegal.

Ernesto Laclau mapped the approach of the emergence of populism in three conceptions (Laclau, 1977) i.e., must be practiced, but are difficult to unite. This happens because there are several different desires between community groups or certain political groups that are difficult to harmonize. It usually happens in political contestation to win their favored political figures such as the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections and the 2019 Indonesia's Presidential Elections. Third, Populism is not emphasized on the cultural but the ideological Islam. The distinctive feature of these ideological Muslims is that they want an Islamic state and the Islamic Republic of Indonesia. However, populism is a distorted phenomenon influenced by excessive attitudes in Islam and confused religions with politics for the sake of a political victory of power. (Jayanto, 2019)

The phenomenon of Islamic populism is inseparable from the prolonged demands and anger of the people over the regime's promises of unrealized equity in national development (Jayanto, 2019). Vedi R. Hadiz stated that the new Islamic Populism is but a specific manifestation of populist politics (Hadiz, 2016). The reason is that current populist politics, both in developing and developed countries, are closely related to social contradictions as

participation in the process of neoliberal globalization. This shows that Islamic populism is a manifestation of a massive movement in the political contestation arena of the nation and state. It seems to be an obligation for them in every movement to do everything to win their favored political figure such as using Islamic elements.

2. The Origins of Islamic Populism Groups in Indonesia

Islamic populism in Indonesia initially became apparent in pre-independence, made way through the Soekarno administration, and linger on until today. At that time, President Soekarno was improving the politics in Indonesia which was selfish and out of control. This can be seen from the politics of government implemented and is known as Nasakom (Nationalist, Religious, and Communist) (Investment, 2020). The steps taken by President Sukarno were to change the political system into guided democracy. This step was effective in dealing with political chaos by forcing the Dutch who wished to control Indonesia during the Dutch Military Aggression I and II. This policy succeeded, which was realized in the anti-imperialist actions against the Netherlands, leading to a referendum decided during the Round Table Conference (KMB) in late 1949. Also, political parties such as Masyumi were also disbanded by President Soekarno in 1960 for allegedly supporting the rebellion of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI). This step shows that during President Sukarno's era, there was a national populism with an authoritarian approach under the Guided Democracy regime.

After the Old Order period, Soeharto was appointed President and applied the principles of Pancasila democracy. President Soeharto neutralized the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila with various threats and subversive action for those who interpreted them, except the government (Huda, 2012). In the New Order era, President Soeharto reduced the number of political parties that could participate in the elections into three, namely United Development Party (PPP), Indonesia Democratic Party (PDI), and Functional Group (Golkar) (Fadillah, 2019). This practice showed the neo-liberal authoritarianism in the politics of President Soeharto's government. As a result, it rose to the pressure of Islamic populism to change the government into democracy. Azyumardi Azra explained that the analysis of the factors of Islamic awakening was driven by three supporting factors including deteriorating position of Muslim countries in the conflict, very rapid social change due to distrust in Muslim societies, and the crisis of legitimacy in a secularly-oriented political system (Azra, 2016) Thus, the Islamic revitalization in Indonesia began since the fall of President Soeharto's regime on May

22, 1998. This is shown from the birth of Islamic organizations in Indonesia such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) which became a pioneer of Islamic populism in Indonesia.

Then in the reform era, Indonesia implemented the practices of national populism. This can be seen from B.J. Habibie's quick policy to create political development reform (Sulistya, 11 September 2019). The step was to restore the interests of the law to open democracy. This step shows the austerity of President B.J. Habibie in forming a constitutional democracy that was nationalist-populist to improve the political conception in Indonesia.

The national politics improved significantly following the political contestation of power between Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto during the 2014 Presidential Elections. Although the victory was on Joko Widodo's side, it raised political suspicion for his opponents. The impact of the political movement was carried out by Prabowo supporters who are part the Islamic populism groups. This happened due to the stereotype of Prabowo supporters who suspected that the PDIP carried out dirty political tactics. When Jokowi ran for the Presidential candidate in the 2014 Presidential Elections, he still held the office of Jakarta Governor with Deputy Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly called Ahok), a Christian of Chinese ancestry. It was the cause of political suspicion. There was worry about Indonesia's leadership if it was held by Ahok.

Moreover, Ahok intended to extend his term of office by taking part in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Elections. At that time, Ahok, pairing with Djarot Saiful Hidayat, was pit against Anies Baswedan - Sandiaga Uno and Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono - Sylviana Murni in the elections. As Deputy Governor cum acting Governor, Ahok did a working visit to Pramuka Island, Thousand Islands (*News*, Selasa, 09 Mei 2017 10:35 WIB). During a speech there, he made a statement quoting verse 51 of Surah Al-ma'idah which later backfired on him. Lots of Muslims in Indonesia were against him. This was shown in the national movement of Muslims in Monas called the Action of Defending Islam (ABI), which was carried out continuously.

The rise of Islamic Populism is influenced by several factors, including the renewal of political style shown by candidates of anti-establishment with a simple and popular attitude; dissatisfaction to the previous government's performance in overcoming social problems; voters' doubts over the general elections as a place to find the ideal leader; and the contrast of clientelist politics which further strengthens people's distrust of the party system and political parties (Margiansyah, 2019). Therefore, this convinced the figure of Islamic populism to

embrace the aspirations of voters as an instrument of the people through the Action of Defending Islam (ABI).

The Action of Defending Islam (ABI) has become a vehicle for the GNPF Ulama in mobilizing the people when there is political upheaval (Sumandoyo, 2 Mei 2018). The movement of the Action of Defending Islam (ABI) did not stop until they successfully imprisoned Ahok. Their movements were replicated during the 2019 Presidential Elections which juxtaposed Jokowi-Ma'ruf and Prabowo-Sandi. As a result of the distrust and disappointment of the members of the Action of Defending Islam (ABI) to Jokowi, they made their populist messages to strive for Prabowo-Sandi's victory in the 2019 Presidential Elections. They spread hoaxes and SARA issues to boost the popularity of Prabowo-Sandi, aiming at their victory.

3. Practices of Islamic, Political and State Islamic Populism Groups in Indonesia

The Islamic populism group can be described as follows: (1) it consists of people who are devout in practicing religious rituals of Islam; (2) it always carries out the practices of the Sunnah of the Prophet carefully people of the group were afraid of being called *bid'ah*; (3) it understands the Qur'an and the Hadith literally because the people of the group wanted to avoid sin; and (4) the group always feel responsible to uphold an Islamic state based on Islamic Sharia wherever the group is. The reason for that was that Islamic law cannot be practiced without an Islamic state (Siti Mahmudah, 2016).

The political practice of Islamic populism ignited the emergence of this group in the politics in Indonesia. Islamic populism is formed as a social mobilization based on an asymmetrical cross-class alliance. This term emerged as a result of an increasingly dynamic politics. According to Vedi R Hadiz, there is a difference between previous Islamic populism and the current ones. This difference is seen in the narrative language made by Islamic populism. According to Hadiz, the new Islamic Populism is thus geared to win greater access to state power and tangible material resources for the ummah (Hadiz, 2013). It means that the current Islamic populism is more directed to the victory of political power that can support their ideals. Islamic populism groups spun messages in the name of Islam as a tool to win greater access to state power. As a result, it created the Islamic and political views (*al-Islam wa al-siyasah*) which are now inseparable (Azra, 2016).

The state practices of Islamic populism had been around since pre-independence Indonesia. This group initially focused more on the narrative language emphasizing on the concept of Islamic state based on formal Islamic law. This can be seen from their never-ending struggle to return to the Jakarta Charter. It is a struggle towards the Islamic Republic of Indonesia formally without considering the pluralistic nation. They accept Pancasila as the basis of the Indonesian state, but they still want the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Indonesia.

This understanding has made Islam a political symbol in winning political power in Indonesia. The reason is that Islam has been made as an exclusive and crucial identity for the benefit of the nation and state (Azra, 2016). So, Tariq Ramadan said in his book that all the mass movements shared common characteristics: protest against social and economic conditions, rejection of dictatorship, fight against corruption but each has its own very specific features, which in turn requires individual analysis (Tariq Ramadan, 2012). This means that mass movements have characteristics that generally criticize social, economic conditions, reject dictatorships, and also fight corruption, each of which has its own style. Likewise, Islamic populism in portraying political contestation by using Islamic identity, such as protecting the ulama, getting closer to Muslim associations, enlivening various Islamic studies, spreading SARA issues related to their favored leader, giving compensation to orphans, using a cap, sarong, koko shirt, hijab in public with the intention of political propaganda (Zamroni, Ahad, 29 April 2018 05:00).

D. Victory and Defeat of Islamic Populism Group in 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections and 2019 Presidential Elections

1. Victory Strategy of Islamic Populism Group in 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Election

The 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections became a barometer of the game played by the political elites and religious leaders as supporters of each candidate. That Jakarta was an exclusive area and the capital city of Indonesia became a consideration. It raised overthinking related to leadership if it were held by people who were considered bad. Therefore, each party argued on choosing a candidate to maintain the benefits for the group.

This phenomenon occurred during the 2016-2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections. The Islamic populism groups used all abilities in manipulating their political strategies to boost

the popularity of candidate pairs in the presence of religious leaders, traders, farmers, as well as all elements in Jakarta to win the office of Jakarta Governor in 2017. They spread their candidate's political promises as well as hoaxes and SARA issues of other candidates as a political weapon to convince them to vote for their recommended candidate. It is intended that the political elites could control the government in accordance with their wishes.

The peak success of the Islamic populism group was when the issue of al-Maidah verse 51 quoted by Ahok during his visit and campaign in the thousand islands on September 27, 2016, further strengthened their political identity. This event built up the Islamic populism movement driven by the GNPf-Ulama, FPI, LPI, and the United Muslim Community Forum. This massive demonstration was called the Action of Defending Islam (ABI) volume I (1410) on October 14, 2016, which demanded that Ahok be jailed (Saleh, 2018). According to the Director of Populi Center, Usep Ahyar, when SARA issues increasingly became public, there would be those who felt intimidated. It could destroy public trust in the candidate pair of Ahok-Djarot. Taufik Basari, an Ahok-Djarot team, admitted during the campaign period that there were SARA issues one of which was Muslims should not elect non-Muslim candidates (News, "Isu Sara meningkat di Pilkada DKI Jakarta, Salah Siapa?" (Online). , 24 Maret 2017). As a result, the public was more concerned with SARA issues than the performance of candidates.

A LIPI Political Expert, Siti Zuhro, said that the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections were the worst regional election in the history of regional elections in Indonesia. This elections should have been an example for other regions. In fact, the campaign was not educating and did not solve social problems, but was dominated by the politics related to SARA issues. Eko Bambang Subiantoro, Anies-Sandi's consultant, claimed that his client did not get any benefit from the SARA issues but it was purely the trust of the people of DKI Jakarta (Ridhoi, 10 April 2017).

Charles U. Larson categorizes campaigns into three types i.e.: product-oriented, person- or candidate-oriented, and idea- or ideologically-oriented (Larson, 2010). Product-oriented is the mission to be realized; person- or candidate-oriented is the personality background of the candidate; and idea- or ideologically-oriented is the vision that will be realized. In the community's point of view, these three things will form a political strategy based on the personality of the candidate supported by Islamic populism.

This phenomenon plays an important role in modifying political movements. This is useful to boost the charisma of a candidate to win political contestation and this step was carried

out by Islamic populism. Through the campaign, Islamic populism deceived the community, especially younger voters who were still unstable and joined in choosing leaders. Their track record during the political contestation of the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections was dominated by SARA issues such as meme photos, banners and videos that are racist and derogatory, which then triggered netizens' comments on social media. For example, banners related to the ban on choosing candidates of different religions and insulting Islam, which was Ahok-Djarot. While Agus-Sylviana candidate pair who carried the concept of a floating city for the Jakarta area spread in the form of videos on social media, causing people commented that it was impossible (Kompas.com, Kamis, 29 Desember 2016 | 22:44 WIB). Meanwhile, Anies-Sandi candidate pair was defamed as Syi'ah follower as well as Wahhabist of liberal thoughts. This became an easy target for party politicians from each candidate in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Elections. For the political elites, the support of Islamic populism became a medium to increase their polling.

In the political battle of the 2017 Jakarta's Gubernatorial Elections, the candidates and supporters used various means for political gains such as *blusukan*, food distribution, social funding, brochures, calendars and the most effective is through media (Saleh, 2018). Meanwhile, the role of social media is very important in the era of globalization which is used by individuals to interact with each other beyond the limit of distance and time. Basically, interaction is a medium in political socialization that supports the formation process of political culture. This political culture will be absorbed and becomes character building for the community by influencing people's emotions to form a mindset for the community of a candidate pair.

When the community is successfully influenced, the political elite will easily control the election process. Thus, they held a social group such as the FPI, the GNPf Ulama and others to help win the candidate nominated by their political parties. In fact, the group was an Islamic populism group having the same goal, which was rejecting Chinese and Christian leadership and rejecting leadership without a clear concept. Resultantly, Islamic populism in Jakarta had been exploited by political elites against certain candidate pairs with a great strategy in the framework of a political victory of power and it was successful.

2. Factors Causing the Defeat of Islamic Populism Group in the 2019 Presidential Elections

The atmosphere of victory after the 2017 Jakarta's gubernatorial elections has led to the next level of confidence for Islamic populism and is used as the main capital for the 2019 Presidential Elections. However, the victory phenomenon was analyzed by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). Prof. Syarif Hidayat said that the LIPI survey related to the SARA issues was raised because of the capitalization and manipulation of the political elites in the community (*Republika.co.id*, Selasa 07 Aug 2018 16:05 WIB). The percentage obtained by LIPI in its survey included the spread of hoaxes (92.4%), hate speech (90.4%), radicalism (84.2%), social inequality (75.2%), threats (71.1 %), religious aspects (67.6%), and SARA (67.6%) (*Tempo.com*, Kamis, 2 April 2020). These were the factors that indicated the defeat of Islamic populism in the 2019 Presidential Elections. The Indonesian Muslim community cannot be persuaded to believe the SARA issues that were increasingly growing, irrational, and had deviated from the Islamic teachings *rahmatan lil 'alamin*.

The hypothesis proposed by Prof. Azyumardi Azra was that the spread of hoaxes before the 2019 Presidential Elections would not be able to topple Jokowi (*Kompas.com*, 2016). In fact, hoaxes and SARA issues have been spread through social media and have caused disputes among Muslims. Then, it formed an ideological stigma in the community in choosing their respective presidents. As a result, it had a significant impact especially on candidate number 2, Prabowo-Sandi, because they were the closest candidates to Islamic populism groups such as FPI, HTI, Islamic Community Forum (FUI), Alumni Brotherhood 212, and GNPF-Ulama (Jayanto, 2019).

Islamic populism groups had their narrative language in decorating political contestation in the 2019 Presidential Elections. Azyumardi Azra said that the Islamic populism groups have a track record that cannot be denied in the Indonesian politics. Starting at the time of the Action of Defending Islam (ABI) Volume I (1410), on October 14, 2016, they pushed Ahok to be convicted for blasphemy. They not only tried to punish Ahok, but also made a political plot to change the Constitution to al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah as a form of conspiracy against the leader of the legitimate government, Joko Widodo. (Octaviani, 2017)

The Metro Jaya Regional Police secured some people suspected of being involved in efforts in political treason along with the Action of Defending Islam (ABI) including Ahmad Dhani, Ratna Sarumpaet, Maj. Gen. Ret. Kivlan Zein, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Eko, Adityawarman, Firza Husein, and Jamran. (*Indonesia*, Sabtu, 01/12/2018 12:49 WIB) The police claimed that the arrest had been monitored three weeks before the Action of Defending

Islam (ABI) was held. Those people were arrested on charges of hate speech, spreading hostility, and evil conspiracy.

The arrest made by the Jakarta Metropolitan Police became a clear evidence of the accusation of political treason that triggered the Action of Defending Islam (ABI). Nevertheless, the accusations were immediately responded by the GNPf-Ulama who asserted that the Action of Defending Islam (ABI) is not a specific Islamic group or political plot, but rather a representation of the Muslims in Indonesia (Jayanto, 2019). This formed the message of Islamic populism as the concept of 'the ummah.'

After the Action of Defending Islam (ABI), the actions of Islamic populism created polemic in the community. Even President Joko Widodo responded to the historic event on November 4, 2016. He assumed that there was a series of attempts of political treason against some opposition figures suspected of being involved in facilitating and providing support in the action (Octaviani, 2017). Then, FPI and GNPf Ulama interpreted Jokowi's response as tyrannical gesture against Muslims (Octaviani, 2017). This is the ground of disappointment in Islamic populism groups that convinced them to make an oath and obey the Prabowo-Sandi candidate in the 2019 Presidential Elections. This can be seen in the second Ijtima Ulama conducted by the GNPf Ulama, FPI, FUI, and other Islamic groups. It discussed political narrative related to the success of Prabowo-Sandi to defeat President Jokowi. The decision of Ijtima Ulama No. 02 / Ijtima / GNPf-Ulama / Muharram / 1440H are (*Tempo.co*, Minggu, 16 September 2018 18:26 WIB):

1. Able to implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in a pure and consistent manner;
2. Ready to maintain and uphold religious and ethical values in people's lives from notions that are destructive and contrary to decency and norms in Indonesia;
3. Prioritizing the people in every policy making process in the principles of representation, proportionality, justice and togetherness;
4. Paying more attention to the needs and interests of religious communities, both Muslim and non-Muslim in Indonesia;
5. Able to maintain and manage the Ukhuwah Islamiyyah (brotherhood of Muslims) with justice and peace;
6. Maintaining national natural wealth for the benefit of the people;
7. Maintaining the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) from the separatism and imperialism;

8. Supporting the struggle for Palestinian independence on various global diplomacy according to the mandate of the 1945 Constitution;
9. Ready to maintain MPRS TAP No. 25/1966 to protect Indonesia from the communism and understandings that could be a threat to the nation and state;
10. Ready to protect religions recognized by the Indonesian government from various acts of defamation and others that can cause offense or horizontal conflict in accordance with the law in Indonesia;
11. Ready to continue the reform to uphold fair laws;
12. Ready to guarantee the right to associate, gather and express opinions both verbally and in writing;
13. Ready to guarantee a good life for every citizen to realize food sovereignty, the availability of clothing and home;
14. Ready to provide a budget that prioritizes general education and religious education proportionally;
15. Providing budget allocations to ensure public health and hospital services both public and private hospitals;
16. Ready to use the constitutional rights of the President to rehabilitate, guarantee the return, and restore the rights of Habib Rizieq and provide justice to the Ulama, activists 411, 212 and 313 who got criminalized and the regime's tyranny;
17. Respecting the position of the ulama and be willing to consider the opinions of the ulama and other religious leaders in solving the problems of the nation and state.

The phenomenon of the Islamic populism in the Action of Defending Islam (ABI) and the second Ijtima Ulama, became a political effort that continued ahead of the simultaneous elections in 2019. Their efforts in social media were very easy and fast to spread. Massive attacks in cyberspace, become a surefire strategy in influencing the ideology of society as voters. However, the vote count showed that the Jokowi-Ma'ruf to be the President and Vice President of Indonesia. It showed that the Islamic populism failed to win the Prabowo-Sandi candidate.

Arya Fernandes explained that the failure and ineffectiveness of identity politics disseminated in the community during the 2019 Presidential Elections were influenced by 3 factors including: simultaneous elections between the legislature and the executive that hindered the development of negative issues, the apparent use of identity politics when the issue of the two partners shifts into economic and development issues during the campaign

period, changes in choices in community groups based on the ideological preferences of the voters themselves (Fernandes, 2018). However, the most dominant thins in the defeat of Prabowo-Sandi pair in the 2019 Presidential Elections was that the use of hoaxes and SARA issues as identity politics driven by Islamic populism groups could not change the voters' ideology.

Conclusion

The momentary victory received by the Islamic populism group after the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Elections, which was used as a weapon in the pre-2019 Presidential Elections, lead to disappointment following the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election. This is an after-victory defeat of the Islamic populism. The Islamic populism groups were disappointed in Prabowo who turned to Jokowi as his political choice with the reason that real politics means victory.

From this case, we learn that hoaxes and SARA issues cannot be that effective. It is because besides Islamic population groups, there are nationalist groups and moderate Muslim groups in Indonesia who continue to teach rational Islam and rahmatan lil 'Alamin in communities and are more acceptable to the truth.

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